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Arne Johan Vetlesen (2015) The denial of nature: environmental
philosophy in the era of global capitalism (London: Routledge) xi + 223
pp. ISBN 9780415724746 cloth, 9781315848273 paper.
This book argues for a paradigm shift in environmental philosophy. Arne Johan
Vetlesen, who is a Norwegian ethicist, asserts that environmental philosophy is
implicated in the pathologies it otherwise seeks to challenge. In order to
become part of the proverbial solution, rather than the problem, Vetlesen
argues for an experience-based philosophy predicated on concrete
engagements with the biophysical world.
The denial of nature is comprised of four long, dense yet readable chapters
sandwiched between an introduction and a conclusion. Vetlesen’s starting
point is the fact that environmental philosophy has grown in size and
prominence during a period when the natural world has lost ever more of its
naturalness due to human activities. One might surmise that this simply reflects
the limited role that philosophy today plays in shaping public values. But
Vetlesen identifies a more fundamental problem: according to him,
environmental philosophy has been pursued in the same intellectual and
abstract manner as most other areas of Western philosophy. This serves to
hold ‘real nature’ at a distance and presumes that reasoning about nature’s
value can, in the end, change hearts and minds. For Vetlesen it thereby
reproduces the society-nature dualism entrenched in the wider culture, while
ignoring the massive psychological investment modern people have in a
capitalist way of life that systematically separates most of us from sustained
contact with a biophysical world we are, nonetheless, utterly dependent on.
What is needed, he argues, is a truly radical approach to environmental
philosophy that redefines the intellectual and affective basis on which
philosophising occurs.
In chapter 1 Vetlesen describes the character of society-nature relations with
reference to Theresa Brennan’s books Exhausting modernity (2000) and
Globalization and its Terrors (2003). Brennan’s neo-Marxist approach blends
political economy with psychoanalytical theory. Vetlesen commends her
attempt to show that the separations and abstractions that capitalism creates
have a crucial psychic element: they penetrate into people’s sense of self, not
least by institutionalising the notion of ‘individuals’ separate from ‘society’ and

‘environment’. Technology is a key part of this since it mediates people’s
physical relations with soils, minerals, animals and much more besides.
In chapter two – entitled ‘Nature deficit in critical theory’ – Vetlesen takes the
Frankfurt School to task for its persistent anthropocentrism and limited
attempt to explore the ecologically destructive character of modern capitalist
societies. The School’s nature denial is taken as symptomatic of critical social
theory more widely. Chapter three then considers how environmental
philosophy has sought to acknowledge and challenge this anti-ecocentrism.
Vetlesen focuses on the well- known ethicists Paul Taylor, J. Baird Callicott,
and Holmes Rolston III. But he also offers an appreciative discussion of Hans
Jonas’s philosophy of being (Jonas is not usually discussed by Anglophone
environmental philosophers). According the Vetlesen, Jonas’s ideas provide a
vital bridge between the ecocentric philosophy of Taylor, Callicott and Rolston
and the experience-based ecocentric ethics that we desperately need to
institutionalise and normalise worldwide. This is because Jonas pushes us to
consider the world not in intellectual terms but in practical terms, as
organisms existing in nature who are themselves of nature.
A major everyday barrier to such practical engagement is technology. In a
capitalist world technologies are ubiquitous and ever changing. They
paradoxically connect us with nature even as they distance us from it. Vetlesen
turns to another post-war German philosopher – Gunther Anders – to help
readers appreciate the psychic implications of these technologies. As the
decades pass, capitalist technology institutes an ever-more insidious
devaluation of nature, causing irreversible biophysical loss and change. Towards
the end of the chapter, taking indigenous cosmologies and the example of
animals, Vetlesen points towards an experiential environmental ethic that
involves people in a new sense of world and of self. In the conclusion, partly
inspired by the writings of Freya Matthews, Vetlesen advocates ‘panpsychism’.
This acknowledges the psychic dimension of all physical things and processes.
For Vetlesen it is only achievable by immersion in life’s buzzing, blooming
confusion and present-day neoliberal capitalism is inimical to that. This means
that conventional philosophical reasoning is neither necessary nor sufficient to
help change the world. On the contrary, only a revolution in our way of life
will allow panpsychism to strike us as more than a fanciful philosophical
proposition.

As a non-philosopher I found the book to be stimulating. It surveys a lot of
intellectual territory with clarity and presents an interesting plenary argument.
Though some might find his case too derivative of others’ writings, Vetlesen’s
book made me ponder whether the majority of Western social science and
humanistic scholarship exists in an ‘iron cage’ it is powerless to escape. Though
we academics believe ‘academic freedom’ is something real and valuable,
Vetlesen implies that un-freedom reigns insofar as environmental philosophy
internalises its wider socio-environmental context ‘all the way down’. It is
interesting to consider, in the context of this journal, just how ‘independent’
critical realist thinking is in its various permutations.
This said, there are a number of obvious problems that arise with Vetlesen’s
call for a paradigm shift in environmental philosophy. First, on what basis does
his argument for a less academic and abstract philosophy arise? Is he himself
‘experienced’ in his positive sense of that term? I ask because the book’s style
is typically philosophical: long chapters pay homage to key thinkers and
variously praise or criticise their thinking en route to Vetlesen’s preferred
version of an ecocentric ethic. This leaves one wondering if the author is using
the resources of the ‘old’ paradigm to argue for a new one; there’s certainly
nothing alternative about the mode of argumentation. Secondly, the author
aside, what potentialities exist in the contemporary world to suggest that
Vetlesen’s thesis is anything more than a case of wishful thinking? The book
stays clear of discussing what immanent forces might foster a widespread
protest against present-day ‘ecocide’. The book’s own argument suggests that
an anthropocentric ethics is now so widespread globally that experience-based
alternatives to it are increasingly sparse and lack the power and visibility to
mount a challenge. Indeed, the book’s final page laments the ‘vicious cycle’ we
are collectively stuck in. The result is that The denial of nature is unable to do
more than enjoin its readers to change, as if the power of argument could
counteract the lack of historical conditions conducive to its realisation.
Vetlesen knows that injunctions are not nearly enough, and so his book takes
on some of the melancholy we associated with Adorno’s post-war conclusion
that that solutions may not exist for systemic problems.
In sum, this is an engaging book that is a pleasure to read. But I am not sure it
takes environmental ethics in quite the new directions Vetlesen wants to
travel.
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